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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS OF PRINCIPAL
Medwedeff v. Fisher, et al.'
By her will, Annie Fisher left the residue of her estate
in trust for her eight children and the three children of a
deceased son. The instrument contained the following
spendthrift clause:
"I direct that all moneys paid to any beneficiary
shall be paid into his or her hands and not into the
hands of any other howsoever claiming, and without
the right of anticipation, and that distribution of in-
come shall be made quarterly beginning three months
after my death, if that be possible."'
Testatrix died October 4, 1929 and the trust, by its
terms was to expire ten years after her death unless further
extended by the unanimous vote of the beneficiaries. David
Fisher, one of the beneficiaries, was adjudicated bankrupt
June 28, 1938. Plaintiff, trustee of the bankrupt estate,
filed a bill to determine the validity of the trust as to
corpus and income. The Court of Appeals affirmed a de-
cree adverse to the plaintiff.
Earlier Maryland decisions left no doubt as to the valid-
ity of the spendthrift clause as to income,' but in this case
the Court's opinion said:
"Although we are aware that in most jurisdictions
the corpus of a trust cannot be subjected to a spend-
thrift clause, we still adhere to the rule in this state
that this can be done, even though principal and in-
come are payable to the same beneficiary. ' 4
The quoted portion of the opinion is noteworthy in
that it marks the first time that the Court of Appeals on
1 17 A. (2d) 141 (Md., 1941).
17 A. (2d) 141, 142 (Md., 1941).
The following cases have either expressly or impliedly recognized the
validity of spendthrift trusts of income; Smith & Son v. Towers, Garnishee,
69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497, 15 A. 92, 9 Am. St. Rep. 398 (1888) ; Maryland Grange
Agency v. Lee, 72 Md. 161, 19 A. 534 (1890) ; Reid v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 86 Md. 464, 38 A. 899 (1897); Jackson Square Assn. v. Bartlett, 95 Md.
661, 53 A. 426, 93 Am. St. Rep. 416 (1902); Wenzel v. Powder, 100 Md.
36, 59 A. 194, 108 Am. St. Rep. 380 (1904) ; Plitt v. Yakel, 129 Md. 464, 99
A. 669 (1916); Houghton v. Tiffany, 116 Md. 655, 82 A. 831 (1911) ; Safe
D. & T. Co. v. Ind. Brewing Asso., 127 Md. 463, 96 A. 617 (1916) ; Manders
v. Mercantile Trust Co., 147 Md. 448, 128 A. 145 (1925); Johnson v.
Stringer, 158 Md. 315, 148 A. 447 (1930) ; Bauernschmidt v. Safe Dep. &
Tr. Co., 176 Md. 351, 4 A. (2d) 712 (1939) ; In Re Dudley's Estate, 3 Fed.
(2d) 832 (D. C. Md., 125), aff'd 7 Fed. (2d) 118 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925);
Suskin & Berry v. Rumley, 37 Fed. (2d) 304, 68 A. L. R. 768, 15 Am. B. R.
(N. S.) 232 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
'17 A. (2d) 141, 144 (Md., 1941).
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the facts of the case before it, has expressly held valid a
spendthrift trust of principal. This decision is directly
contra Section 153 of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts,
though the Court of Appeals made no mention of that fact.5
Though the issue had never been expressly decided in
Maryland, both Federal and state cases were cited as au-
thority for the Court's conclusion that it was following
"the rule in this State". A survey of those cases presents
an interesting picture of how legal doctrine emerges.
In Plitt v. Yakel6 testator provided for certain legacies
and also for a distribution of income among named bene-
ficiaries. A spendthrift provision in the will related to
"all legacies and bequests". It was there held that the
gift of income was, by the spendthrift clause, protected
from attachment in the hands of the Trustee. In determin-
ing the question of the settlor's intention so to protect his
bequests of income, the Court, without questioning the
validity of the restriction as to principal, said that the
spendthrift clause related (meaning the settler intended it
to relate) equally to legacies of fixed sums and bequests
of income.7
In Suskin and Berry v. Rumley8 the question was
whether a remainder of corpus contingent upon bank-
rupt's survival of a life tenant would pass to the trustee
in bankruptcy. After holding that such contingent re-
mainders were not property within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act, the Court turned its attention to the
spendthrift clause, which expressly covered income and
principal:
"But there is another reason why, under the law
of Maryland, the interest or expectancy of bankrupt
in the trust estate could not have been transferred by
him or levied upon and sold under judicial process
against him; and that, is that the will creating the
trust estate specifically provides that the income and
ultimately the principal thereof shall be paid over to
The pertinent Maryland cases are cited and analyzed in the Maryland
annotations to Sec. 151 of the Restatement. The opinion of the lower
Court appears in The Daily Record, May 8, 1940. It gave the subject a
far more extended treatment than did the Court of Appeals, referring to
numerous authorities and reasoning that there is no distinction between
restraints upon alienation of income and similar restraints on corpus. In
either event, the trust is generally a matter of public record and creditors
cannot claim to be misled.
S129 Md. 464, 99 A. 669 (1916).
129 Md. 464, 468, 99 A. 669, 671 (1916).
537 Fed. (2d) 304, 68 A. L. R. 768 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
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the respective beneficiaries and to no one else, and
that no such beneficiary shall be entitled at any time
to alienate, anticipate or encumber, his, her or their
share of the income or principal and that the same
shall not be liable to be taken or attached for his, her
or their debts. There can be no question that this
creates a valid spendthrift trust under the laws of
Maryland, and that no interest in the property subject
thereto can be aliened or transferred by any benefi-
ciary or reached in satisfaction of his debts". [Citing,
among other cases, Plitt v. Yakel] .9
The Maryland case of Michaelson v. Sokolove'0 dealt
with and held valid a restriction on alienation very similar
to that created by spendthrift trusts. There, the insured
elected that the proceeds of his life insurance be paid one
hundred dollars monthly to his beneficiary with restriction
on transferability. The beneficiary's assignee was denied
relief, the Court observing that similar restrictions had
been upheld in the Maryland spendthrift trust cases. How-
ever, unlike the earlier Maryland spendthrift trust cases,
which dealt only with income, the Court was now applying
the restriction to what was a mixed return of principal and
income. According to Griswold on Spendthrift Trusts,1
this decision was in accord with a limited number of cases
and statutes dealing with annuities outside of Maryland.
But, the Court of Appeals did not discuss the exact nature
of the problem nor the conflicting policies involved.
The majority view outside of Maryland on spendthrift
trusts of principal is probably represented by the Restate-
ment. According to Scott, the better view is that the bene-
ficiary's right to principal may be "assigned and reached
by his creditors ... especially when the principal is pay-
able on the death of the beneficiary to his estate. Even
though it may be desirable to permit the settlor to insure
the beneficiary's support during lifetime, there is no good
reason why he should be permitted to dispose of the trust
property on his death if his creditors are left unpaid.' '12
Griswold, in his work on Spendthrift Trusts, after re-
viewing the conflict of authority on the point, makes the
following statement:
037 Fed. (2d) 304, 307, 68 A. L. R. 768, 772 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
10 169 Md. 529, 182 A. 458 (1935).
"GRIswoLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1936) Sec. 257.
12 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) 770. See also Par. 15.33 N. 5 citing cases from
Cal., Mass., Minn., Mo., Pa., Tex., Vt., supporting the view now adopted in
Maryland.
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"The only conclusion apparently that may safely
be drawn from these cases is that they have shown a
growing appreciation of the distinction between a right
to receive income and the right eventually to receive
the principal. The two are not the same and there
is no reason requiring that the same conclusion be
reached as to both.' 13
In view of the inconclusive state of authority on the
point, it would be unfair to criticize the result reached
by the Maryland Court. The decision makes clear a point
previously doubtful. But, the manner in which the Court
justified its ruling is somewhat unsatisfactory. It seemed
wholly unaware of the fact that the so-called "rule in this
State" stems from Plitt v. Yakel, which can hardly be dig-
nified as a supporting dictum.
Some of the criticism should indeed lie with the Fed-
eral court which, in the Suskin & Berry case, accepted the
statement in Plitt v. Yakel as determinative of facts to
which the statement had no reference. There was like-
wise a failure on the part of the Federal court to analyze
the policy supporting spendthrift trusts and the advisa-
bility, in the light of that policy, of sustaining a spend-
thrift trust of principal. The Suskin case made it some-
what more excusable for the Maryland court to assume the
existence of a settled rule in the Michaelson case and in the
instant case.
However, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals
should not have followed "the rule" contrary to the Re-
statement without a clear analysis of the exact foundation
in precedent for its decision. The Court might profitably
have clarified its views on the validity in general of re-
strictions upon alienation. Though the same conclusion
might nevertheless have been reached, it is submitted that
it would have been better for the Court to have discussed
the essential questions of policy involved. 4
18 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1936) Sees. 88-101. See also (1939)
27 Georgetown L. J. 815; (1929) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 63; (1927) 41 Harv. L.
Rev. 409; 52 A. L. R. 1259; 35 A. L. R. 1034.
", For discussions of questions of policy involved see: 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS
(1939) 742, Sec. 152; GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION (2d Ed. 1895) ix;
Costigan, Those- Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled "Spendthrift
Trusts" Reexamined (1934) 22 Cal. L. Rev. 471; GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRnr
TRUSTS (1936) 29; Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation
Since Gray (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 373; BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF TnE LAW
OF TRUSTS (1921) 180; 1 PERRY, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (7th Ed. 1929) 644 ff.
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